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Abstract 
 
 The story of the land war of the American Revolution has been told many times.  
However, the naval conflict remains largely ignored except for its most famous aspects, 
such as the voyages of John Paul Jones.  When the sea battles of the Revolution have 
been discussed it has mostly been in the context of the end of the war when the navy had 
already existed for some time.  Historians such as William Fowler and Nathaniel Miller 
have attempted comprehensive studies of the Continental Navy, but neither focus on the 
character and significance of naval combat in the first year of the war.   
The early naval battles of 1775-1776 demonstrate that the navy of the United 
Colonies was still a decentralized, disorganized force that was controlled not by a central 
governing agency but by independent local leaders.  These men looked for opportunities 
for success and valor, perhaps even for personal profit, and took advantage of 
opportunities as they arose, whether it was part of the navy’s larger plan or not.  These 
characteristics were illustrated in the Battle of Machias, the Battle of Nassau, and the 
Battle of Valcour, in each of which men acted on their own initiative, and with the 
exception of Valcour, experienced success.  The valuable and unique nature of the naval 
war of the American Revolution from 1775-1776 becomes clear through a close 
examination of the formation of the Continental Navy and the interconnections between 
the land and sea war.   
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                                                1 Nowland Van Powell, “Continental Ship, Alfred,” http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NH_85212-
KN.jpg.  
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The first shot of the American Revolution came in April 1775 at Lexington, 
Massachusetts.2   In the centuries since the American Revolution, it has been the subject 
of wide-ranging scholarship that has adopted multiple perspectives and intepretations.  
One area that has lacked careful research and close scrutiny, is the role of the naval 
battles and the Continental Navy itself.  Although the Continental Navy only played a 
role until 1778, at which time the French navy took over the naval front of the war, it laid 
the foundation for the United States Navy.3  In the early years of the war this navy was 
anything but regulated.  After the creation of the Continental Navy in 1775, John Adams 
created rules and regulations that were to govern the new defense force.4  However, these 
distant guidelines were rarely followed by the Continental Navy.  While there were 
problems with having a decentralized naval force, it did provide the rebellious colonies 
with some advantages over Great Britain.  With the American naval forces having little 
oversight, they were able to act with far greater flexibility than their British counterparts, 
who were restricted by the goals and designs of their superiors.  The flexibility of the 
American naval forces and army allowed them to immediately react to local conditions in 
the most expeditious manner.   
This independent, flexible, and decentralized spirit among the naval forces can be 
seen especially clearly before the navy was officially formed.  In May 1775, colonists in 
Machias, Maine, rose up against Ichabod Jones, a trader from Boston.  Although the 
Patriots were not necessarily in the majority there, they saw an opportunity to further the 
                                                
2 Edmund S. Morgan, The Birth of the Republic, 1763-1789 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 
68. 
3 William M. Fowler, Rebels Under Sail (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1976), 89-90.  
4 United States Continental Congress, Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of the United Colonies 
(Philadelphia, 1775). 
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cause in which they believed.  This independent spirit and willingness to take action, 
carried through the early years of the war.5  This same spirit was seen in Esek Hopkins’s 
cruise to New Providence in the Bahamas.  Instead of following his orders to cruise 
Narragansett Bay, Hopkins sailed to the Bahamas and led an amphibious assault against 
Fort Nassau.  Although this was a successful assault, and secured valuable supplies for 
the Americans, Hopkins violated his orders, an extreme measure even for the 
decentralized nature of the navy, and attacked a British colony instead of just protecting 
the American coast.  Hopkins went to New Providence because he saw a valuable 
opportunity and took advantage of it.  These actions further demonstrate the localized and 
independent spirit that was evident in the Continental Navy.6   
The Battle of Valcour also highlighted these characteristics.  Although this was 
performed as a legitimate military act against Great Britain, it still demonstrated that 
Benedict Arnold was willing to go beyond his duties as an army officer to make a naval 
assault on the Royal Navy.  In October 1776, Arnold led a quickly assembled American 
fleet against the much stronger British Navy.  While a defeat for the Americans, they 
fought valiantly and secured a secondary strategic goal in delaying the British advance, 
which proved that an independent, decentralized force could indeed make a difference.7  
These battles demonstrated that in the opening phase of the American Revolution the 
United Colonies’ naval forces relied heavily on the independent decisions of the men 
who led them.  The Battle of Machais, the Battle of Nassau, and the Battle of Valcour, 
                                                
5 James Lyons, “Chairman of Machias Committee to Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” reprinted in 
Naval Documents of the American Revolution, 1774-1775, Volume 1, comp. William Bell Clark, (United 
States Naval Department, 1964), 676-677. 
6 Fowler, Rebels Under Sail, 96. 
7 Pennsylvania Gazette, October 23, 1776, reprinted Naval Documents of the American Revolution, 1776, 
Volume 6, comp. William James Morgan (Naval History Division Department of Navy, 1972), 1391. 
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together demonstrate that the success of the Continental Navy was based on strong 
individual leaders. 
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Chapter One: The British Navy 
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8 J.A. Atkinson, Costumes of Great Britain, No. 3 1807: Post Captain, 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Royal_Navy_Post_Captain.jpg.  
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The end of the eighteenth century was a time of change in the British Navy.  The 
social status of naval careers was rising in Britain, and the Royal Navy became seen as a 
respectable career path for the sons of gentlemen to take if they were not inheriting land.9  
Despite this change, a majority of the officers in the navy were not sons of gentlemen, 
although these young men did have the best chance of becoming commissioned 
officers.10  On the other end of the spectrum were the young men that joined the navy but 
were illiterate; for them the likelihood of receiving a commission was almost non-
existent.11  At this time the admiralty had to rely on being given good candidates for 
officers, as there was little that they could do to train or educate them.  The only true 
method that existed was the Naval Academy, founded in 1737, at Portsmouth.  This 
venue for educating future officers did not play much of a role and usually only had 
around forty students.12  Thus they relied on the already educated to rise through the 
ranks based on their performance, as opposed to a formal training program for their 
officers.13 
In addition to growing respectability, the late eighteenth century also led to the 
creation of semi-professional specialization among the commissioned officers.  Most of 
this development came in the form of transport agents who were employed and 
uniformed by the Navy Board.  In addition, promotions increasingly became based on 
skill, as opposed to political connections.  Lord Sandwich, who was named Lord of the 
                                                
9 N.A.M Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815, (New York: W.W. 
Norton and Company, 2004), 388-391. 
10 Ibid, 383. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid, 386. 
13 Ibid. 
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British Admiralty for the third time in 1770, carried this out.14   Under his leadership the 
Royal Navy would go to war against their North American colonies.  His strategy during 
this conflict was greatly affected by tensions that existed between Lord North, Lord 
George (Secretary of State for the Colonies), and himself.15  Nonetheless, from the time 
that the conflict broke out in British North America the necessity for naval involvement 
was clear.16  The role that the Royal Navy would play in the American Revolution faced 
more than ideological road blocks.  This was in part caused by the disarmament of the 
Royal Navy during peace time.  Once war broke out, the Navy had to be essentially 
rebuilt and staffed.17  At this particular time the Royal Navy had a problem with manning 
its ships both with seamen and officers.18   
 Due to these difficulties, the Royal Navy initially served primarily as a means to 
transport troops during the conflict with the colonies.   However, after the landing of 
troops in Boston failed to solve the problem in 1775, a more direct approach was decided 
upon.19  The next phase was for Vice Admiral Lord Howe and Major General Sir William 
Howe to launch an amphibious attack that involved landing the army on Long Island, 
then crossing Manhattan and finally routing the rebel army.20  By 1776, as the war 
intensified, “the Navy and Vicutalling Boards had taken up over 146,000 tons of 
transports, 46,000 tons more than the maximum of the previous war.”21 Although the 
Royal Navy made a significant commitment to the conflict in the mainland colonies, this 
                                                
14 Ibid, 329 and 390. 
15 Ibid, 331. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid, 381. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid, 333. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid, 333. 
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conflict was not its main focus.  Instead Great Britain was focused on the looming war 
with France and Spain, which posed a much more direct threat to their safety, and thus 
required more direct attention from the British navy.22   
One of the reasons that the Royal Navy became as involved as it did in the North 
American conflict were the attacks by American privateers on British vessels.  After 
Captain John Manley’s American squadron proved to be enough to contend with the 
dispersed Royal Navy in May 1777, it became clear that a greater naval presence was 
needed there because a small American force was able to vanquish ships of the Royal 
Navy.23    However, a large portion would not be stationed in the colonies until after the 
Battle of Saratoga in 1777, at which point it became clear that the French were going to 
get involved.  The imminent involvement of the French navy in the conflict forced Lord 
Sandwich to commit more of the Royal Navy to the North American conflict than the 
conflicts that were emerging in Europe.24  The British navy may not have been heavily 
involved in the American conflict at the onset, but it did force the colonists to take to the 
sea to combat the ships that were stationed there, especially in response to the blockade 
against Boston.25 
 The Royal Navy also aided the success of the Continental Navy because of the 
changes that it underwent at the time of the Revolutionary conflict.  Following the Seven 
Years War, the conflict between the European powers turned to the interior of the 
continent, meaning that Britain had to rely more upon her land troops than her navy.  This 
                                                
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid, 335-336. 
25 Ibid, 334. 
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shift in focus caused Great Britain to appear vulnerable as a naval force.26  Thus, when 
the American Revolution broke out Britain had to rebuild her navy.  In addition they were 
faced with the problem of operating far from home.27  In addition, the administration of 
Lord North was very disorganized in its war operations.28 Each of these factors combined 
to create an atmosphere that was perfect for the colonists to develop their own naval 
force.  A disadvantaged Royal Navy allowed the colonists to feel confident in taking the 
war to the sea, as they saw that the opportunity existed for them to be successful.  
Furthermore, once war broke out between France and Britain the navy was divided, 
between European and American theaters, giving the colonists and their allies an even 
greater advantage. 
 In the second half of the eighteenth century the Royal Navy had to overcome 
growing pains, “From 109 seagoing ships in 1690, the fleet had increased by 1765 to 
266.”29  This a setback in ship building because there wasn’t enough money to expand 
and modernize the shipyards to meet the growing demand.  In addition, the navy was in 
need of new ships because many of the older ships were beginning to fall apart.30 The 
ability of the naval yards to expand and increase production relied on the government’s 
approval.  This was only one of the ways in which the government maintained firm 
control over the navy and its operation.31  Whoever was lord of the admiralty made vital 
decisions concerning the navy.  For example, when Lord Sandwich became lord of the 
admiralty he discontinued the program established by Egmont to improve the shipyards. 
                                                
26 Ibid, 328-329. 
27 Ibid, 333. 
28 Ibid, 335. 
29 Ibid, 368. 
30 Ibid, 370-371. 
31 Ibid. 
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However, a few years later when finances improved he reinstated his program.  The fact 
that the government had so much control over the navy that it could change a critical part 
of the Royal Navy’s development, demonstrated how centralized it was.  This was in 
direct contrast to the Continental Navy and other naval operations within the colonies that 
relied more on each captain’s individual decisions than those that were made by the 
Continental Congress.   
 As a whole the Royal Navy at the end of the eighteenth century was still a 
powerful force, but not as powerful as it was prior to the Seven Years War.  This slight 
decline demonstrated to the world and to the colonies that if there was a time to take on 
the Royal Navy, this was it.  In addition, the British government was more concerned 
with maintaining their financial balance than making improvements to shipyards that 
were necessary for creating an even stronger force.  This demonstrated that the British 
Navy was at a crossroads, and that the government alone determined the path which it 
would take.  This not only opened the door for the colonists to effectively take on the 
British navy, but also demonstrated how different the Continental and Royal Navy were 
in their administration.  The colonists did not want their government, or the organization 
of their navy, to follow the very centralized British tradition.  The Royal Navy had long 
been a symbol of tyranny and power abuse, which the colonists wanted to avoid.  Instead, 
the revolutionary colonies succeeded in creating a decentralized, flexible navy.32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
32 Ibid, 379. 
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33 “Machias Bay 1776,” http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:MachiasBay1776.png.  
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Barely a month after the opening shots of the American Revolution were fired at 
Lexington and Concord, the first naval action of the war occurred in Machias, Maine.34  
The battle broke out after Ichabod Jones, a merchant from Boston and a loyalist, 
attempted to get supplies from Machias.  The group of Patriot colonists in the town took 
action to ensure that none of their lumber would fall into British hands.  They attacked 
the British ship, the Margaretta, and Jones’s two sloops, the Unity and the Polly.  
Although this naval battle was very brief it was the first naval battle of the war, and 
demonstrated the decentralized and flexible spirit of the colonies in this early phase. 
In William Fowler’s Rebels Under Sail and in Nathan Miller’s Sea of Glory, the 
Battle of Machias is presented as laying the foundation for the formation of the 
Continental Navy.  Both Fowler and Miller spend their few pages on Machias discussing 
what happened just prior to and during the battle.  The main difference between these two 
accounts was that Fowler focused on constructing his own account of the battle, which 
focused heavily on the people that were involved.  The description of the battle itself was 
brief, but effectively informed the reader of what transpired.35  Miller also informed the 
reader of what happened during the battle and just after, but he spent more time on the 
injuries and damages that were done during the battle.  For example, Miller discussed 
how the school was transformed into a hospital to care for the wounded, a fact that was 
completely absent from Fowler’s.36  In addition, Miller incorporated more direct quotes 
                                                
34 Fowler, Rebels Under Sail, 17. 
35 Fowler, Rebels Under Sail, 18-19. 
36 Nathan Miller, Sea of Glory: The Continental Navy Fights for Independence 1775-1783 (New York: 
David McKay Company, Inc., 1974), 36. 
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from primary sources, while Fowler just presented the information.37  As a pair, these 
texts presented a comprehensive view of the Battle of Machias.  Fowler gave a clear 
picture of the battle, while Miller emphasized the physical costs of the battle.  While each 
text took a slightly different approach to the battle they each came to the same conclusion 
that the Battle of Machias, to quote William Fowler, “had done much to strengthen the 
cause of those in the Massachusetts Provincial Congress who were urging a naval 
armament.”38 
Miller and Fowler may have approached the Battle of Machias in very similar 
ways, but another view was presented in the journal The Aldine, in an article titled “The 
Lexington of the Sea.” This article was published in 1876, during the countires 
centennial.  Thus, the article captured the fervor for the Revolution that was presented at 
this time.  This article focused on James Fenimore Cooper’s account of the battle in The 
History of the Navy of the United States of America, volume One.39  It was Cooper who 
first made the comparison between the Battle of Lexington and the Battle of Machias, 
Lexington being the first battle on land and Machias the first battle at sea.40  Since 
Cooper provided this designation, a large part of this brief article quoted directly from 
Cooper’s work.  While it was interesting to read about Cooper’s view of the battle, it did 
not lend itself to any deeper understanding.  The most useful part of this article was the 
opening when the author discussed the problems that the colonies faced in establishing a 
naval force.  The author wrote that the colonies struggled to have a naval force because it 
                                                
37 Miller, Sea of Glory, 36. 
38 Fowler, Rebels Under Sail, 20. 
39 “The Lexington of the Sea,” The Aldine 8, no. 2 (1876): 68. 
40 Ibid. 
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was harder to create or maintain than an army because vessels were required, and because 
it was unlikely that any naval attacks on Great Britain would be successful.41   
The colonists at Machias proved, though, that it was possible for a small force of 
colonists to take on a British ship and be successful.  It began when Captain Ichabod 
Jones, a loyalist merchant out of Boston, arrived in Machias with his two ships the Unity 
and the Polly in May 1775.42  There was nothing unusual about this encounter as Jones 
often traded with the residents of the town, serving the dual purpose of bringing them 
provisions, and trading with them for his own profit.43  Jones was such a frequent visitor 
to Machias that he even owned an estate there.44  He knew the people well, and thus was 
well aware that a section of the Machias population would not respond favorably to his 
presence.45   
The concern that the Patriot colonists of Machias would do something to the 
loyalist Jones and his ship was so great that Vice Admiral Samuel Graves was informed, 
“Whereas his Excellency the Governor hath represented to me that some of the 
Inhabitants of the Eastern parts of this Province have threatened to intercept and destroy 
the Vessels of Mr. Ichabod Jones […]”46 Graves acknowledged the importance of this 
fear, but he did not cancel Jones’ trip to Machias, where he was getting lumber for the 
Royal Navy.  In order to give Jones a better chance of being successful, Graves arranged 
                                                
41 Ibid, 67-68. 
42 “James Lyons, Chairman of Machias Committee ,” volume 1, 676. 
43 Fowler, Rebels Under Sail, 17. 
44 “Petition of Benjamin Foster and Jeremiah O’Brian to the Massachusetts General Court,” reprinted in 
Naval Documents of the American Revolution, 1774-1775, Volume 1, comp. William Bell Clark, (United 
States Naval Department, 1964) 924. 
45 “Vice Admiral Samuel Graves to Midshipman James Moore, Commanding his Majesty’s Armed 
Schooner Margaretta,” reprinted in Naval Documents of the American Revolution, Volume 1, 1774-1775 
comp. William Bell Clark (United States Naval Department, 1964), 537. 
46 Ibid. 
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for an armed schooner, the Margaretta, captained by James Moore, to be an escort.47  
Although he had good intentions in providing an armed escort, the presence of the 
schooner made the colonists at Machias more suspicious of Jones’s and his intentions. 
Once arriving in Machias, Jones did his best to avoid conflict with the colonists.  
He did not want his trip there to spark violence between Patriots and Loyalists, he wanted 
to trade.  In order to avoid conflict Jones requested that colonists sign a petition stating 
that they approved of trading with him. 48  When first presented with this petition a 
majority of the colonists signed it.  However, once they learned that he intended to trade 
with the British, according to James Lyons, some colonists regretted that they signed the 
petition.  The colonists claimed they were unaware of Jones’ true intentions when they 
signed this petition.49  Although it was likely that some were unaware of Jones’s 
intentions, it was doubtful that even a majority of those who signed the petition were 
ignorant of his loyalties.  In an article published on August 14, 1775, in the Newport 
Mercury, referred to Jones as “that noted friend of government,” which demonstrated that 
his loyalties to Britain were no secret.50  The well-known nature of Jones’s loyalties 
suggested that Lyons may have overstated the number of colonists that wanted to attack 
the Margaretta when he wrote to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety.51  
Lyons benefited from making it appear to Massachusetts as if more colonists 
supported the attack on Jones and the British because it justified their actions at a time 
when the colonies were just beginning to fight the British.  In addition, a positive account 
                                                
47 Ibid. 
48 “Lyons to Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” Volume 1, 676-677. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Newport Mercury, August 14, 1775. 
51 “Lyons to Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” Volume 1, 676-677. 
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of the battle would earn him more support from the Massachusetts Committee of 
Safety.52 However, this was not the case, as the attack on Jones and the Margaretta was 
carried out by a small number of Patriot colonists.  It was unlikely that any of these men 
had signed the petition that Jones shared with the town, further undermining Lyons’s 
attempt to justify their actions by stating that the petition was misleading.53  Thus when 
the attack did occur, lead by men such as Jeremiah O’Brien, it was not an example of an 
organized, premeditated attack carried out by the entire town, but rather an assault 
performed by the small Patriot contingent in Machias who saw an opportunity to weaken 
the British and took it.54  The attack began while Captain James Moore and another 
officer of the Margaretta were onshore in Machias at the Meeting House.  At this time 
the Patriots of Machias made their first attack on the British naval officers in their midst.  
Had they been successful here, the mob may have stopped with the attack at the Meeting 
House, but Moore and the other officer managed to escape in an offshore schooner, and 
thus the fight between the H.M.S. Margaretta and the colonists of Machias took to the 
sea.55 
The colonists of Machias involved in the attack began by plundering one of 
Jones’ sloops that was anchored at the falls (see figure 1).  Upon catching up to the 
schooner that carried Jones and Moore, the colonists demanded that it surrender to the 
Sons of Liberty.56  The main reason that the colonists wanted to capture the ship was so 
that they could take Jones prisoner because they blamed him, as a merchant, for the 
                                                
52 “Journal of Massachusetts Provincial Congress,” Volume 1, 750. 
53 “Lyons to Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” Naval Docs, Volume 1, 676-677. 
54 “Pilot Nathaniel Godfrey’s Report of the Acton Between the Schooner Margaretta and the Rebels at 
Machias,” reprinted in Naval Documents of the American Revolution, Volume 1, comp. William Bell Clark, 
(United States Naval Department, 1964) 655. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
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problems that they had, such as increased taxes.57  Once again though, the matter was not 
to be settled so briefly.  Moore refused to surrender to these rogue Patriot colonists, and 
for the time being the colonists actually allowed Moore and Jones’s to depart.  The 
conflict resumed later that evening.58  
Figure 1: 
59 
The fighting resumed at this time, because Captain Moore began to move the 
Margaretta down river so that it was closer to Jones’s sloops.  In order to prevent this, 
the colonists ran Moore and the Margaretta aground.  They demanded that he “strike to 
the Sons of Liberty, threatening with Death if he resisted […].”60  This time Moore’s 
refusal was not allowed to go unpublished.  The Patriot colonists exchanged fire with the 
Margaretta.  The attack did not last long, and tipped off small bouts of fighting, which 
continued throughout the night.61  The fighting during the night was the result of attempts 
made by the Patriot colonists to board the Margaretta.  The British sailors refused to let 
                                                
57 Ibid. 
58 “Godfrey’s Report on the action at Machias,” Volume 1, 655. 
59 “Machias Bay 1776,” http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:MachiasBay1776.png, annotations by 
Sarah Kent. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
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the colonists take advantage of them so easily, and fighting lasted for the remainder of the 
night.62   In order to avoid further attack, the Margaretta dropped down stream with the 
assistance of a local sloop commanded by Captain Toby (see figure 2).63 
Figure 2: 
64 
Jones and Moore attempted to complete their escape the next dawn by heading 
into the Bay of Fundy, once again with the assistance of Captain Toby.  By this time the 
Patriot colonists were fired up and were looking for a fight.  Despite the Sons of Liberty 
being in the minority at Machias, they persisted in their attack even as the British made 
their final attempt to leave peacefully.65  When captains Jeremiah O’Brien and Benjamin 
Foster, and the twenty to forty men who followed them, decided to pursue the British, 
they were not acting in the interest of the community, but rather in the interest of the local 
chapter of the Sons of Liberty.66  Nonetheless, these two men were able to raise a force 
that took advantage of a lone Royal Navy schooner, which gave the colonists an 
                                                
62 “Godfrey’s Report on the action at Machias,” Volume 1, 655. 
63 “Lyons to Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” Volume 1, 676-677. 
64 “Machias Bay, 1776,” http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:MachiasBay1776.png, annotations by 
Sarah Kent. 
65 Ibid. 
66 “Lyons to Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” Volume 1, 676-677. 
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opportunity to overpower the British at sea.  In order to chase down Jones and Moore, 
O’Brien and his outfit of forty men used one of Jones’s captured merchant sloops to 
chase the Margaretta.67  In its current state Jones’s sloop did not stand a chance against 
an armed schooner of the Royal Navy; it would have been quickly destroyed if the 
Margaretta fired any broadsides.  This, however, did not deter O’Brian and his troops 
who built breastworks on the former merchant sloop as they pursued the Margaretta and 
Jones.68 
Once O’Brian and his crew caught up with Jones the two ships began an exchange 
of fire in the bay (see figure 3).69  In the course of this fighting the Patriots mortally 
wounded Captain James Moore, who later died at the Jones’ second home in Machias.70  
Other than Captain Moore, the British saw only five men wounded.  The colonists, 
however, had six wounded men, one of whom later died, but during the battle, they like 
the British suffered only one casualty.71  Although the results of the battle were evenly 
matched on both sides, the colonists succeeded in taking a number of the British men 
captive, including Captain Jones himself.72  In addition the colonists captured Jones’s 
other sloop, the Margaretta, and the cargo that these ships held.  This included “four 
double fortified [sic] three pounders, & fourteen swivels, and a number of small arms 
[and] a very small quantity of ammunition.”73  The plunder that the colonists at Machias 
seized as a result of this early battle was where their true victory against the British lay. 
                                                
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 “Nathaniel Godfrey’s report on Battle of Machias,” Volume 1, 655. 
71 “Lyons to Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” Volume 1, 676-677. 
72 “Nathaniel Godfrey’s report on Battle of Machias,” Volume 1, 655. 
73 “Nathaniel Godfrey’s report on Battle of Machias,” Volume 1, 655. 
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Figure 3: 
 74 
This early victory would not have occurred had it not been for the actions of a few 
men acting on their intuitions.  While the idea may have existed before the battle actually 
occurred, the actions that the colonists actually took were the result of the opportunities 
that presented themselves at the time of the battle and the leadership of Captain O’Brian.  
For example, had Captain Moore and his other officer not been at the Meeting House the 
colonists would not have had the opportunity to plunder one of Jones’s ships, which 
would later help them in catching up to the Margaretta.  In an organized fight with a less 
independent leader the colonists would never have been able to react as quickly to the 
unique opportunities that presented themselves.  This battle, which started the naval war 
of the American Revolution, set the stage for a war of unorganized battles and 
independent leaders that took advantage of opportunities for victory as they came, instead 
of developing a carefully planned strategy. 
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Although this independent action taken by Jeremiah O’Brian and the colonists at 
Machias led to a Patriot victory off of the Maine coast, it also created problems that the 
colonists were not prepared to deal with.  For example, deciding what to do with the 
prisoners they took.  Determining what to do with the prisoners taken during this 
engagement was no small feat as many men had been taken.  The men taken prisoner 
included, “Capt. Knight. Lieut. Spry, five Midshipmen and Warrant Officers, together 
with 17 privates […]”.75 James Lyons, chair of the Machias Committee of Safety, 
suggested that they send the prisoners to Pownalborough, on the Kennebec River, in a 
letter he sent to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress.76  This Congress decided during 
their meeting on July 13, 1775 to appoint an officer from the Watertown militia and a 
guard of no more than eight men, to convey the prisoners from Machias to Worcester.77  
Once they arrived in Worcester the men were to be imprisoned indefinitely.78  Only two 
of the prisoners had a different fate.  Jedediah Preble and Enoch Freeman, esquires, were 
required to build whaleboats as a public service instead of being imprisoned.79 
It was likely that Preble and Freeman were given this lighter sentence because 
they were skilled shipwrights or because they played little to no role in the fighting that 
occurred.  Ichabod Jones also had a different experience as a prisoner, because of the key 
role that the colonists attributed to him.  Instead of being sent directly to Worcester he 
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was detained in Machias.80  On July 28, 1775 the Massachusetts House of 
Representatives received a petition from Jones’s wife, Apphia, requesting that her 
husband, still in Machias, be allowed to appear before the Massachusetts General Court.81  
The result of Apphia Jones’ request was that her husband was moved to the prison in 
Worcester with the other men that were captured at Machias.  However, upon his arrival 
Jones was kept in solitary confinement, until the Massachusetts Council ordered that he 
be allowed to interact with the other prisoners.82  This harsh punishment demonstrated 
that to the Patriots he was a traitor and a threat.  While this judgment was overly harsh it 
demonstrated that the Patriot colonists at Machias were waiting for the opportunity to go 
after the British.  The arrival of Ichabod Jones with an armed escort provided this 
opportunity. 
Dealing with the British prisoners taken at Machias was only one of the tasks that 
had to be completed after the battle occurred, for the Massachusetts Provincial Congress 
created a special committee to examine what had occurred at Machias.  They looked at 
how similar problems should be dealt with, and whether or not naval protection should be 
provided for the colony.83  Thus, when the Massachusetts Provincial Congress received a 
request from Machias on July 7, 1775 requesting an armed sloop, it went to this 
committee.84  Machias was given permission to outfit this sloop, and Massachusetts 
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would provide a captain for it.85  An entry in the journal of the Massachusetts House of 
Representatives on July 28, 1775, recommended that an additional force be sent to 
Machias to protect the town’s sheep and cattle from British plunder.86  By August 18, 
1775 Machias had also been approved to have a small troop and to receive supplies from 
Massachusetts to outfit it.  Each of these measures was taken because the residents of 
Machias feared that the British would seek vengeance for the Patriot victory.87 
Although there was a great deal of concern about the safety of Machias after this 
battle, fear was not the only sentiment present.  After their victory, there was an outburst 
of patriotic sentiment among the colonists in the town.  This patriotism was so strong that 
it even gained the notice of George Washington.  In a letter to the General Court of 
Massachusetts Bay he stated, “I cannot but Applaud their Spirit and Zeal.”88  This same 
“Spirit and Zeal” which motivated the Patriot colonists in Machias to attack the 
Margaretta made them want to invade Nova Scotia, to further bring the war to the 
British.  Washington, as much as he appreciated their desire to fight, condemned this 
notion, saying that it was foolish and that Nova Scotia had done nothing to provoke an 
attack from the colonies.89 
The Battle of Machias both demonstrated and furthered the independent spirit of 
some of the residents of the town.  Men such as Jeremiah O’Brian and Benjamin Foster 
took action when they saw it as profitable, not when they received orders from a captain 
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of the militia, or when they were left with no choice but to fight back.  The British did not 
attack the colonists at Machias, the colonists attacked an armed British schooner and two 
merchant sloops that belonged to an American merchant who was a loyalist.  These 
colonists took advantage of their strengths, such as capturing one of Jones’s fast sailing 
sloops early on, to overwhelm the small British force at this small port.  There was no 
plan ahead of time for this battle, as can be seen with the different phases it went through, 
such as firing on the British throughout the night and pursuing them to the Bay of Fundy, 
because the actions of the British here could not have been predicted ahead of time.90  In 
addition, because of the location of Machias on the periphery of the United Colonies’ 
made it easier for the colonists to act on their own, given their distance from the central 
government.  This allowed them to act without fear of repercussions from the 
Massachusetts government of Continental Congress for their actions.  Had Machias been 
more centrally located the colonists may have been stopped or punished for acting against 
the majority in order to attack the British. 
The Battle of Machias demonstrated how flexible, unorganized battles and naval 
forces could be effective if they had an independent leader, but it also demonstrated some 
of the problems that came from these types of actions.  For one, the colonists at Machias 
did not have a plan for what to do with the prisoners and had to turn to Massachusetts for 
advice.  They also had not considered until after the battle that retaliation was a 
possibility.  In addition to the lack of forethought, these early battles led by strong willed 
independent men often ignored the opinion of the majority.  Despite the shortcomings 
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that came with a decentralized, independent force, the Battle at Machias did help to 
further naval operations in the war and the efforts to create a Continental naval force.  
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The formation of a national naval force was a laborious process for the colonists 
at the onset of the Revolutionary conflict.  It was met with both great resistance, and 
some very strong support.  Much of the support came from John Adams, who was cited 
as the father of the Continental Navy.92  The hesitation to create a navy did not stem from 
lack of experience, but from a hesitation to commit to the conflict with Great Britain.  
Although the Continental Navy was officially created in 1775, not even a year after the 
debates began, its development would last until the very end of the war.  Ultimately, this 
naval force laid the foundation for the modern American Navy, but the Continental Navy 
itself did not survive the Revolutionary period.   
 As in Britain, the sea played an important role in the lives of North American 
colonists.93  For John Adams, the prevalence of the sea in American life was one of the 
reasons he strongly supported an American naval force.  In his autobiography Adams 
stated his belief that if American seamen, “were once let loose upon the ocean, they 
would contribute greatly to the relief of our wants, as well as to the distress of our 
enemy.”94 As hostilities arose between the colonies and Great Britain, Adams argued that 
a naval force had to be created.  With a long coast to defend, and an opponent with a 
strong navy, the necessity for an American naval force seemed clear.  This large coast 
also meant that the colonists had significant maritime experience and were prepared for 
some action at sea.  From 1700 to 1775 the colonies produced more vessels than they had 
in the past, increasing from just four thousand burden a year to thirty-five thousands tons 
per year by the end of this period. This demonstrated that the sea, which had always been 
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important, was playing an even more vital social and economic role as colonial society 
developed and had more of their own ships in the water.95   
Perhaps as a result of this increase, men in the Continental Congress began to 
realize that the colonists were capable of building a naval force to challenge Great 
Britain.  In a letter to John Adams on July 11, 1775, Josiah Quincy questioned why the 
colonies did not have a naval force.96  However, due to colonial fears about deepening the 
conflict with Great Britain its development was delayed.97  Many members of Congress 
were hesitant to develop a national naval force because at this early stage in the war 
reconciliation with Great Britain still seemed possible.  In addition, due to sectional 
divisions within the Continental Congress the delegates were unable to act decisively, 
especially since Southerners feared that New England would dominate the naval force.98   
 Although a naval committee had existed since 1774, the first direct action that 
Congress took to establish a naval force was to authorize the states to fit out their own 
fleets.99  This was primarily done after two early sea battles in which American ships 
demonstrated that they were capable of holding their own against the British fleet.  The 
first of these engagements occurred in Buzzards Bay off the coast of Cape Cod between 
April and May of 1775.  This battle occurred between the Royal Navy and American 
smugglers, during which an American ship was captured.  As a result of this engagement 
the citizens of Dartmouth used their own vessels and not only reclaimed the ship, but also 
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managed to take fourteen prisoners.100  Further steps to establish a naval force would take 
place after the first official sea battle of the war took place in Machias, Maine.101   
Machias suggested that colonists, in certain circumstances, could take on the 
Royal Navy with their own ships, and, in fact, were able to instill considerable fear into 
the sailors of those vessels.  This mimicked Adams’s earlier view that American seamen 
would be a useful and fearsome tool in the American fight against Great Britain.102  It 
also demonstrated the ferocity with which the colonists believed in their cause, and their 
abilities in sailing.103  Increasingly after Machias, local ships and their owners throughout 
the colonies began to take on a quasi-military role.  For example, the whaleboats in 
Boston began to take on British ships that were troublesome to Boston’s commerce.104  
The armament of these smaller vessels led General George Washington to take another 
step towards a formal navy.  Washington began to construct a fleet of schooners that he 
refitted and armed.105  The purpose of these schooners was simply to interrupt British 
shipping, not to wage war against British ships.  This was a necessary precaution because 
in the summer and fall of 1775 war had not been officially declared against Great Britain, 
and thus outright attacks by the United States forces at sea could have potentially 
worsened a situation that still might have been remedied.106    
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The colonies had standing militias prior to the conflict to keep their towns safe, so 
the creation of a Continental Army was much less of a jump because the foundations and 
organizations for it had existed long prior to the war.  However, because the colonies 
never had a formal fleet to protect the coast the creation of a navy demonstrated a greater 
commitment to armed conflict, which they were not ready to make until late fall of 1775. 
Washington stood by his rag tag fleet despite the problems that he experienced with it, 
such as officers not following orders and openly seeking conflict with British ships.107  
This fleet laid a foundation for the Continental navy, and demonstrated that it was 
needed, as colonists saw more attacks along the coast.    
In response to the British attacks along the coast, the Continental Congress 
realized that some provision needed to be made to ensure the protection of the coastal 
colonies, especially the harsh reprisals against rebellious New England colonies in this 
opening phase of the war.  However, there was still much debate about whether the 
nation should establish its own naval force.108  On July 18, 1775 it was decided that each 
colony should be responsible for protecting its coast.  This did not authorize a national 
force, but did authorize each colony to pursue naval action against the British as 
necessary to protect their shores.109  The first of the colonies to establish a state navy was 
Rhode Island, and by August of 1775 they were commissioning armed ships to guard 
their shores.110  As the states were protecting their own shores the Congress began 
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working towards the creation of a national navy.  One of the first steps taken towards this 
was the presentation of the Rhode Island Resolutions on October 7, 1775 to the 
Continental Congress.111  This resolution suggested the construction of a full-scale 
American fleet. However, it was met with ridicule as many congressmen saw a navy as 
unnecessary and therefore did not understand why Rhode Islanders wanted to spend so 
much money on one.  There was great concern that the new navy would be concentrated 
in New England, thus giving those colonies an unfair economic advantage over others.112 
The individuals who wanted to see a navy created were determined to convince the 
delegates to approve a navy.  This was demonstrated in Samuel Ward’s diary entry dated 
October 3, 1775.  He wrote that he had received a request from the Rhode Island 
assembly that the delegates be persuaded to undertake the construction of a navy.113  
Constituents wrote their delegates at the Continental Congress, informing them of the 
desire for a naval force.  However, the plea from Rhode Island did not persuade the 
Congress to create a navy. 
 In early October, the Continental Congress received two letters from John Barry, 
which proved to be the final step in convincing Congress to create a naval force, though a 
small one.  These letters stated that two English brigs were heading to Quebec with 
munitions.114  In order to deal with this situation the Continental Congress appointed a 
three-person committee of John Adams, Silas Deane, and John Langdon to find a 
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solution.115  Within minutes these men proposed authorizing a squadron to intercept the 
ships en route to Quebec.116  However, much like the Rhode Island Resolutions this idea 
was not met with enthusiasm.  Adams acknowledged that many of the Congressmen 
opposed this plan because, “It was an infant, taking a mad bull by his horns; and what 
was more profound and remote, it was said it would ruin the character and corrupt the 
morals of all our seamen.”117  In order to combat these concerns, Adams and his 
committee assured the Congress that the benefits of having a naval force that was able to 
both supply and protect the Americans outweighed the concerns held by the Congress.118  
This plan was accepted on Friday October 13, 1775, and the Continental Navy was 
born.119  Another naval committee wanted Congress to authorize ten ships for a navy; 
however, they only authorized four, which was still double what had originally been 
requested.120  
Now that a navy was agreed upon the work of creating it began.  The original 
committee was enlarged and became the Naval Committee.121  Before this navy could 
take to the seas it needed rules and regulations to dictate how it would operate. This task 
fell to John Adams, perhaps the greatest proponent for the creation of a navy.  As can be 
seen in Adams’s autobiography he truly believed that a Continental Navy would serve the 
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American purpose not only because it provided the American coast with protection, but 
also because it gave the American forces a better way to obtain and transport supplies.122  
Adams served on the Naval Committee until 1778, and would continue to support this 
committee even when he was no longer a member.123  For him, the development of a 
navy was of utmost importance, which was demonstrated in his involvement in its 
creation.124 
On November 25, 1775, Adams presented the rules and regulations that he had 
created for the Continental Navy.125  They contained forty-four articles, which governed 
everything from punishment for violation of the rules to religious services.126   The very 
first article made it clear that Americans feared corrupt officers who were unnecessarily 
cruel.  This article stated that commanders, “are strictly required to shew [sic] in 
themselves a good example of honor and virtue to their men and officers […]”127 In 
addition to the demand that officers behave well, there were also articles which contained 
limits on the extent of punishment that could be performed.  It even made clear the 
different standards to which officers and seamen were to be held.128  By outlining these 
distinctions in the rules of the Continental Navy it ensured that neither party could accuse 
their commander of unfair treatment.   
In addition to placing limits on punishment, such as no punishment could exceed 
twelve lashes on the back with the cat-o-nine tails, Adams’s rules also protected the 
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 34
sailors from being dismissed at the whim of the captain.  If the captain wanted to dismiss 
a crewmember, he could only suspend him or have him confined, he could not force his 
removal.  In order for a crewmember to be removed the captain had to apply for a court 
martial.129  The rules and regulations also contained details for how a court martial was to 
be carried out.  In addition, the captain was required to keep accurate records of any 
seamen he hired and how much they were to be paid.   
This measure ensured that the men would receive fair payment for their service as 
promised.  These rules and regulations did not just protect the crewmen in the physical 
sense, but also in a moral and spiritual sense.  Article two stated that religious services 
were to be performed on the ship twice a day, with a sermon on Sundays.  This was an 
important aspect of these rules and regulations because one of the major concerns that 
members of Congress had about the creation of the navy was that the sailors would be 
immoral.130   With this concern assuaged by the presence of frequent religious services, 
the Continental Congress was free to approve these rules and regulations, which they did 
on November 28, 1775.  These regulations included measures to prevent captains from 
abusing their power.  This was representative of the republican ideals which were evident 
in the founding documents of the United States of the America, which advocated for 
equality and limited power.  In addition, the navy still clung to the traditional idea of 
hierarchy because although the captain’s power was limited, they still had more power 
than any other seaman on the ship.  This mix of equality and hierarchy demonstrated that 
the United Colonies were caught between the traditional, hierarchical world, and the 
world of equality advocated by Republicans.  
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 Once the Continental Navy was voted into existence, Esek Hopkins was named as 
its commander in chief.131 Hopkins was the first choice for many of the delegates to be 
the commander, but it would take the convincing of his brother, Stephen, to persuade 
Esek that this was a worthwhile command to accept.  Stephen emphasized to his brother 
that his pay as well as the portion of seized prizes awarded to him would prove quite 
lucrative.132  Stephen’s method to convince Esek highlighted one of the main problems 
that the Continental Navy would face in getting enough men.  Many men preferred to be 
privateers instead of naval seamen because of its lower risk and of its potential to make 
more money.133 Although Hopkins had misgivings about accepting the appointment, it 
was well received throughout the colonies.  In a letter to Nicholas Cooke the Rhode 
Island delegates at the Continental Congress expressed their pleasure at Hopkins’s 
appointment, “Since our last We have the Honor of two Letters from You. Genl. Hopkins 
has arrived very well, his accepting the Command of the Fleet gives universal 
Satisfaction.”134  With rules and regulations, as well as a commander, the work 
constructing the ships could begin.  
Although the Continental Navy was formally created in October 1775, and the 
Naval Committee became the Marine Committee in 1776, during the early years of the 
war naval conduct differed by ship and was controlled by individual captains.135   From 
1775 to 1776 the organization and coordination of this naval force was minimal, and 
allowed men such as Esek Hopkins to act as they saw necessary, rather than as they were 
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ordered, much as Jeremiah O’Brian had done at Machias.  The Congress acknowledged 
the problems that came from having such a decentralized navy, leading the Marine 
Committee to be reformed.  This time the committee was divided into different 
departments that focused on specific regions.136  The Marine Committee received a great 
deal of criticism, and by 1779 it became the Board of Admiralty.137   
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In early March 1776 the Continental Navy brought the American Revolution to 
the Bahamas.  Here they attacked Fort Nassau and Fort Montagu in New Providence, 
Bahamas.  The attack on Fort Nassau resulted from Captain Esek Hopkins ignoring his 
orders to clear the coast, and instead sailing to New Providence in order to capture 
powder that was stored in the two forts on the island. Hopkins’s disregard of his orders 
demonstrated that the independent spirit, which was prevalent at the Battle of Machias, 
continued into the next year of the war.  Although, this attack was not an official mission 
for the Continental Navy, it was one of the most important successes for the Continental 
Navy had during the war.   This battle was not a traditional battle between two naval 
fleets, but instead was an amphibious assault against the town of New Providence.  The 
American success in this battle relied on the independent actions of Captain Hopkins, and 
the decentralized nature of the Continental Navy, which allowed Hopkins to act in such 
an independent manner. 
The portrayal of the Battle of Nassau in Fowler’s Rebels Under Sail, focused on 
demonstrating that the American victory at Nassau was a demonstration of British 
weakness.  Despite the British presence in New Providence the Americans were able to 
take Fort Nassau from them with out much of a struggle. “After firing off three twelve-
pounders as a symbolic gesture, the defenders of the easternmost fort abandoned their 
positions to the Americans.”139  Despite British weakness evident in this battle, the 
American commander; however, Esek Hopkins was not spared.  Fowler discussed that if 
Hopkins had acted in a more direct manner they would have captured more powder, 
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which would have greatly benefited the American cause.  Fowler’s critiques of both the 
British and American forces demonstrated that this battle truly represented the 
weaknesses within the Royal troops because each side had serious weaknesses, but the 
Americans managed to be victorious.  Other than demonstrating the weakness of the 
British Fowler painted a picture of the battle as it occurred, including the conditions 
under which the Americans had made their way to New Providence.  He also addressed 
the fact that Esek Hopkins was able to go to the Bahamas only by ignoring orders given 
to him.  In sum, the presentation of the Battle of Nassau in Rebels Under Sail highlighted 
the weakness of the British, while simultaneously painting a clear picture of what 
transpired during the battle. 
In contrast to Fowler, Miller, in Sea of Glory, did not address the weaknesses of 
the British.  Instead he gave a detailed description of what actually occurred during the 
battle.  This included not only a listing of the American ships that were present, but the 
methods by which the raid was carried out, and a specific timeline for the attack on Fort 
Nassau.  Unlike Fowler, Miller saw the quick surrender of the forces at Nassau to the 
Americans as justifiable, and not a symbol of British weakness.  He did, however, still 
discuss the shortcomings of Esek Hopkins as a commander, namely his delay of action, 
which cost the Americans a large supply of powder.  Miller’s treatment of Nassau 
focused heavily on the smallpox outbreak that plagued the American forces as they were 
leaving Nassau to return to the United States.  Several ships were set aside as quarantines 
for the sailors who became ill.  This presentation of the battle was most effective because 
of the very detailed description of what occurred.  The rest of the text, particularly the 
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section on the illness, while interesting, did not really add anything to the understanding 
of the battle. 
A very different approach to this battle was taken in Michael Craton’s A History 
of the Bahamas.  This text was very interesting because instead of detailing the battle 
from the American or British perspective, in this case it was examined from the 
perspective of the residents of the Bahamas.  The focus of this was a simple account of 
what occurred during the battle, but the focus was not on the British troops who occupied 
the island, but rather on the American invaders.  Like the texts by Fowler and Miller, this 
text also demonstrated that the Americans easily overpowered the British.  This text spent 
more time looking at the two-week period during which the Americans plundered 
Nassau.  Craton discussed how they entertained themselves at the government palace and 
consumed great amounts of wine that was either given to them or came from their 
plunder.  This text provided an interesting contrast to the texts of Fowler and Miller 
because of the different perspective that it gave.  Instead of the typical account this text 
looked at how the Americans and actions were viewed by the people of the island that 
was attacked. 
The attack on Nassau was never supposed to happen.  Commodore Esek Hopkins 
was given orders to clear the coast of the United Colonies, starting in the south and 
ending in Narragansett Bay.  However, Hopkins decided to execute his own plan, which 
involved the fleet leaving Delaware Bay and sailing to New Providence.  Hopkins wanted 
to go to New Providence because he knew that there was a valuable supply of weapons 
and powder there, and he wanted to ensure that the Americans took possession of these 
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materials.140  Hopkins’s decision to attack New Providence demonstrated that as a leader 
he was an independent thinker, who, much like Jeremiah O’Brian, looked for the most 
beneficial opportunities and took advantage of them.  Attacking Nassau was thus more 
beneficial because of the material gain that it would provide the Americans than clearing 
the American coast.  Thus, in early March 1776 the American fleet arrived off the coast 
of New Providence, which sent waves of concern through the population of the island 
(figure 1).141  
Figure 1: 
142 
In a letter to Vice Admiral Clark Gayton, New Providence resident, John Brown, 
captured his concerns about the presence of the American ships off the coast,   
The present distressed and defenceless (sic) State of His Majesty’s 
Bahama Islands occasioned by the arrival of an Armament fitted out by 
the American Colonies now in open and declared Rebellion.143 
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The American fleet, which Brown saw off the coast, contained the Alfred (twenty-four 
guns), the Columbus (twenty guns), the Cabot (fourteen guns), the Fly (eight guns), the 
Providence (twelve guns), the Andrew Doria (fourteen guns), the Hornet (ten guns), and 
the Wasp (eight guns).144  When these ships first arrived off the coast, though, the 
residents of New Providence believed that they were Spaniards come to attack the 
island.145  It was not until the Americans actually landed that it became clear that in fact 
the invasion was not an act of aggression by Spain, but rather an attack from Britain’s 
rebelling colonies.146  Despite their misidentification, Nassau was ready for the attack.  
Once the ships were spotted, Governor Montforte Browne raised the alarm and had the 
militia assemble.147 
 The militia did not deter the Americans in their goal to besiege the two forts 
located in New Providence.  Both Fort Montagu and Fort Nassau contained large supplies 
of weapons and powder that the Americans were in desperate need of.  These supplies 
were the reason that the American fleet went to New Providence.148  Captain Hopkins 
had no desire to hurt the population; he simply wanted to make sure that his fleet would 
be allowed to take the munitions and supplies with them.  To avoid unnecessary 
casualties, Hopkins issued a manifesto, which stated his reasons for the attack, and gave 
the people warning so that they could get to safety:149   
To the Gentlemen, Freemen, and Inhabitants of the Island of New 
Providence.  The Reasons of my Landing an armed force on the Island is 
in order to take Possession of the Powder and the Warlike Stores 
                                                
144 Miller, Sea of Glory, 528. 
145 “Letter from Captain of Marines,” New York Journal. 
146 Ibid. 
147 “Brown to Vice Admiral Gayton,” volume 4, 461. 
148 Ibid. 
149 “Extract of a Letter from Esek Hopkins,” Virginia Gazette, April 17, 1776. 
 4? 
belonging to the Crown, and if I am not Opposed in putting my design in 
Execution the Persons and the Property of the Inhabitants Shall be Safe, 
neither shall they be Suffered to be hurt in Case they make no 
Resistance.150 
 
In addition to the manifesto, the inhabitants of the island were led to believe that the 
American ships were there at the orders of the Continental Congress.  This gave the 
attack more validity than if it had simply occurred because of Hopkins’s individual 
decision.151  Despite Hopkins’s attempts to keep the residents of New Providence calm, 
panic ensued as the American ships entered the harbor, and the attack began.152 
 On March 6, 1776, the American ships entered the New Providence Harbor with 
the aid of a local pilot.153  The assistance of this pilot made the sail into the harbor much 
easier, and provided Americans the opportunity to launch the most effective attack on 
Fort Montagu and Fort Nassau.154  As the ships entered the harbor, the two forts were 
armed with local troops.  Strategically, the position of these two forts was extremely 
effective as they were located on either side of the harbor (see figure 2).  This should 
have made their goal, to keep the ships from entering the harbor, simple to accomplish.   
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Figure 2: 155 
However, the forts were undermanned because the island’s troops were divided between 
the two, and they were not able to do much to deter the arrival of the ships.156  Governor 
Browne quickly realized that the division of the troops left the island too vulnerable to 
the incoming American fleet, and thus made the decision to relocate all of the troops to 
Fort Nassau, which he labeled as the more defensible position.  Not only was Fort Nassau 
easier to defend, it was also more valuable to the island because it contained most of the 
powder that was kept on the island.157 
 While this was an excellent strategy, it failed to protect some of the gunpowder 
and the island.158  This was in part due to the fact that the residents of New Providence 
had no desire to fight the Americans, and many abandoned the fort and returned home.  
This attitude, while it existed prior to the battle, heightened after the Americans 
successfully took Fort Montagu in the afternoon.  By ten p.m. of that day most of the 
inhabitants and soldiers had left Fort Nassau, so that there were only one hundred men 
left to defend the fort from the American fleet.159 Given the conditions present at Fort 
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Nassau the Americans should have been able to easily take control, and get all of the 
gunpowder, which was stored there.  However, they were unable to do this because of 
Captain Hopkins’s hesitance to act.  This lack of action has led to his critique both by 
historians and by men in his own crew.  Although the American fleet did capture some of 
the gunpowder, a majority of it was removed from the island before the Americans 
started the attack.160 
 Governor Browne made the decision, during a council of war, to send the island’s 
valuable powder to St. Augustine, where he hoped that it would be safe from the 
Americans.161   If Hopkins had been more direct in his attack on Nassau, then the 
governor would not have had time to send the powder to another location, and the 
Americans would have captured all of it.  The American forces desperately needed the 
powder that could have been captured by Hopkins, far more than any of the weapons that 
were actually captured at Nassau.162  Instead, though, Hopkins chose to sit in the harbor 
waiting, which gave Governor Browne time to get the powder on board the schooner, St. 
John, commanded by Lieutenant William Grant, and to send it to St. Augustine.163  On 
his way to St. Augustine, Grant had rebel ships that pursued him, but he did manage to 
make it safely to St. Augustine.  Upon his arrival Grant sent a note to Governor Patrick 
Tonyn, which told of what happened in New Providence. Grant believed that St. 
Augustine was next, “And I doubt not but you may expect a Visit from some of the Rebel 
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Vessels as I imagine they are in pursuit of me.”164 Grant managed to save most of the 
powder that was kept at Fort Nassau by taking it to St. Augustine, but he was unable to 
save all of it.165 
 The Americans were able to capture twenty-four casks of power from Fort 
Nassau.166  While this amount of powder aided the Americans, it hardly compared with 
the other stores that they managed to take during their siege of New Providence.  From 
Fort Montagu the Americans took, “17 cannon, from 9 to 36 pounders, 1240 round shot, 
121 shells, 81 iron trucks for carriages, 22 copper hoops, 1 worm, 2 copper powder 
measures, 1 ladle. Some old iron, copper, and lead.”167  Although this was a sizeable 
haul, the prizes taken from Fort Nassau more than doubled these in number.  From Fort 
Nassau the Americans took seventy-one cannon, five thousand three hundred thirty-seven 
shells, nine thousand eight hundred thirty-one round shot, four hundred seven copper 
hoops, eight hundred0sixteen fuses, and twenty-four casks of powder.168  This was only a 
small portion of what the American fleet was able to capture from the fort.  In addition 
they took copper ladles, flint rope, and some other provisions.169 The American force 
spent two weeks in New Providence loading the supplies into their ships and enjoying the 
wine that they took and were given.170 No matter how many provisions they were able to 
take though, the American fleet had missed the bulk of the gunpowder because of 
Hopkins’s inaction.  The disgruntled nature of the Americans was captured in the account 
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of the battle that John Paul Jones sent to the king of France.171  In this journal Jones was 
very critical of how Hopkins handled the situation, even stating that he could have done a 
better job.  Despite his criticism Jones did not fail to highlight that the attack on Nassau 
was a success.172 
Despite Hokins’s shortcomings that as a captain, he was representative of the    
form that the Navy took in the early years of the war.   Although he was given orders to 
clear the American coast, Hopkins chose to ignore these orders so that he could take 
advantage of a more valuable opportunity: attacking and raiding the forts of New 
Providence.173  He made the decision to not listen to orders and was able to carry out his 
plan because his crew also preferred an attack that promised to bring them prizes.  These 
actions demonstrated that although there were hierarchies in place to govern the 
Continental Navy and its captains, they were not strong enough to actually maintain 
order.  Had the Marine Committee been strong enough to regulate the actions of its 
captains, Hopkins would never have been able to lead his attack on Nassau.     
Although the attack on New Providence was in direct violation of Hopkins’s 
orders it was one of the naval fleets’ most successful missions because of the amount of 
munitions and provisions that were captured there.  The extent of this success 
demonstrated that at times the independent, decentralized nature of the Continental Navy 
was beneficial because it allowed captains to make the most of the opportunities that they 
saw as vital to the Revolutionary cause.  In addition, it demonstrated, like Machias, that 
the further these independent actions occurred from the central government the better 
                                                
171 “Journal Prepared for the King of France by John Paul Jones,” reprinted in Naval Documents of the 
American Revolution, volume 4, comp. William Bell Clark, (United States Naval Department, 1969) 133. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Fowler, Rebels Under Sail, 97. 
 4? 
chance of success they had in carrying out their independent plans.  Although New 
Providence was a populous island, it was far from the colonies.  This allowed Hopkins to 
carry out an unsolicited attack, and not have the government find out until it was too late.  
Had New Providence been closer to Philadelphia the Continental Congress could have 
stepped in, and stopped the attack.  This would have denied what was considered to be a 
very important victory for the American fleet. 
 The American fleet was not alone in recognizing the importance of this battle.  In 
his letter to Vice Admiral Molyneux Shuldham on March 8, 1776, Lieutenant William 
Grant recorded his reaction to the attack, which demonstrated that the American victory 
was not taken lightly.  Grant was so enraged by the attack that he spoke of the Royal 
Navy taking vengeance on the Americans, “And I am Positive the whole Rebel Fleet and 
Armament will fall a sacrifice if attacked.”174  Grant’s bravado in regard to the Royal 
Navy’s ability to defeat the Americans made it clear that he still felt as though the British 
were superior.175  Given the ease with which the Americans took Nassau, however, the 
British seemed weak, while the Americans seemed strong and sure of their abilities.  
Lieutenant Grant was not the only one that wanted to see the Americans crushed.  In his 
letter to Vice Admiral Gayton, John Brown expressed his desire that the British Navy 
attack the American fleet, and save the British colonists in the Caribbean from further 
American attack.176  Brown’s letter acknowledged the strength of the American fleet 
because he felt as though it was a realistic possibility that they would attack again, which 
was why he wrote to Gayton in the first place.  Brown’s letter also made it clear that he 
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still believed in the strength of the Royal Navy.177  This letter demonstrated that although 
the Continental Navy was disorganized and decentralized in the early years of the war, it 
was still a strong force. 
 Brown’s request for aid from the Royal Navy did not fall on deaf ears.  On March 
14, 1776 a council was held on board the Scarborough to discuss the possibility of the 
Royal Navy providing New Providence with protection.178  This once again demonstrated 
the strength of the American Navy, as shown through the Battle of Nassau, because as the 
Royal Navy posed a legitimate concern to the residents of Machias after the battle there, 
so the American Navy was seen as a real threat to the British admiralty and the residents 
of New Providence.  Despite their clear concerns, the men at this council did not reach a 
conclusion about giving aid to New Providence.  They decided to submit a request for 
assistance to Sir Peter Parker, who was supposed to have a large force with him at Cape 
Fear.179   Their hope was that Sir Parker would send this force to the Caribbean to assist 
New Providence and the surrounding islands.180  The one decision that the council did 
reach was in regard to the American fleet.  They decided that it was detrimental for them 
to leave the port of Savannah in order to pursue the Americans because it would leave the 
harbor vulnerable.181   
 On their way back to the United Colonies, Hopkins’s fleet suffered a run in with 
the H.M.S. Glasgow off of Block Island.  There was a brief exchange of fire, during 
which the Glasgow received a broadside from two of the American vessels.  This fire 
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greatly weakened the Glasgow, which caused her to run from the fight.182  The American 
fleet did not just vanquish the Glasgow, but also managed to capture a brig and three 
smaller ships that had accompanied the Glasgow.183  After the engagement with the 
American fleet the Glasgow returned to its harbor a broken ship, “…under all the sail she 
could set, yelping from the mouths of her cannon (like a broken leg’d dog) in token of her 
being sadly wounded.”184  The damage that just two Continental Navy ships did to the 
Glasgow further demonstrated the strength of this new navy.  This victory was made even 
more impressive because Hopkins’s force was greatly weakened by a small pox outbreak 
that was running through the fleet.  This outbreak was so bad that the Andrew Doria, 
where all the men had been vaccinated, was turned into a hospital ship.185  Hopkins force 
was so greatly reduced that upon reaching American shores a letter was sent by Gurdon 
Saltonstall on his behalf to General Washington requesting that one hundred fifty to two 
hundred men in Washington’s troops be enlisted as seamen.186 
 This correspondence demonstrated that the army and the navy, while separate 
entities, were connected with each other, and that often their forces were drawn from the 
same pool.  This connection aided the naval captains in maintaining their independence 
because instead of being forced to turn to the Marine Committee when they were in need 
of something they could instead turn to the Continental Army.  Thus, the power that the 
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Marine Committee had over the Continental Navy was weakened, which allowed the 
captains to act on their own desires and opportunities, instead of following commands.  
The lack of control that the Marine Committee had over the Contiental Navy, and the 
interconnectedness between the navy and the army, played a major role in the Battle of 
Nassau, and continued to play an important role in other battles during the first years of 
the war. 
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Although it was a major defeat for American naval forces, the Battle of Valcour 
on Lake Champlain in October 1776 was a key battle for American sailors.  It pitted 
Benedict Arnold’s forces against a much stronger Royal Navy and demonstrated to the 
world that Americans, whether they were trained seamen or not, were able to put up a 
good fight.  It also demonstrated the independent and decentralized nature of the 
Contiental Navy in the early years of the war because Arnold, who was not an officer in 
the Navy, was able to decide that an American fleet should take on the British fleet on 
Lake Champlain.  Arnold was so sure that this was the correct course to take that he and 
his men built nearly their entire fleet in the forests surrounding Lake Champlain so that 
they could directly face the British fleet.  This battle established the American and British 
holdings in upstate New York, and laid the foundation for the American victory at Fort 
Ticonderoga.  It did more than just that though; it demonstrated that in October 1776, a 
year after its creation, the Continental Navy maintained its decentralized nature, which 
was so prevalent in the battles waged at sea in 1775 and the early months of 1776. 
 For Fowler, the most important aspect of the Battle of Valcour was that it 
positioned the Americans for their victory at Saratoga.  His discussion begins with the 
American decision to build a fleet for Lake Champlain.  Fowler praised Arnold for the 
energy and dedication that he put into the project of building gondolas and galleys to 
assist the few ships the Americans already had on Lake Champlain.  He stated that 
Arnold got involved in everything because he wanted to ensure that it was done right.  In 
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Rebels Under Sail, Fowler stated that Carleton, the British commander, felt the need to 
establish a fleet on the lake after Arnold began constructing his fleet.  This decision was 
caused by Arnold’s efforts, but it was also something that Carleton had wanted from the 
onset, because he recognized the importance of Champlain.  Unfortunately for Carleton 
though, it took a very long time for him to get a fleet of any size or power to Champlain, 
because the ships had to be carried over a land portage to get them around the rapids on 
the Richelieu.  According to Fowler this delay, which also delayed the battle on Lake 
Champlain, was the reason that the British army and Royal Navy did not continue their 
assault against the Americans.  This delay allowed the Americans to strengthen their 
forces at Ticonderoga over the next year, which would allow the Americans to be better 
prepared for the Battle of Saratoga in October 1777.   
 In Sea of Glory, Miller took a different approach from Fowler.  Instead of 
examining how this battle set the colonists up for their important victory at Saratoga, 
which was considered to be a major turning point of the war, Miller focused on the actual 
construction of the two fleets.  Miller began by discussing Arnold’s fleet, which was 
constructed in the forests surrounding Lake Champlain.  He stated that Arnold was 
credited with the design of the fleet, and with being the impetus, which started its 
construction.  Miller thus gave Arnold a much more active role in the construction of the 
fleet from the onset than Fowler did.  In addition, Miller like Fowler, examined the 
difficulties that Arnold faced in getting an experienced crew to man his new fleet, and 
credited the construction of the American fleet as being the reason behind Carleton’s 
work to construct a British fleet for Lake Champlain.  Miller also spent more time 
discussing the technological advancements that were suggested by Lieutenant John 
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Schanck to Carleton to make the portage of the ships easier.  Miller closed his chapter by 
creating a romanticized picture of Arnold and the battle that ensued on Lake Champlain.  
The only mention of Saratoga in Miller’s work comes in the very last paragraph of his 
chapter on Valcour, where he quotes another historian, Alfred Thayer Mahan, who stated, 
like Fowler, that the battle on Lake Champlain was crucial to the American victory at 
Saratoga. 
 Although Miller and Fowler each took a different approach to the Battle of 
Valcour, they came to the same conclusion that it laid the foundation for the American 
victory at Saratoga a year latter.  Paul Nelson, however, in his article for New York 
History, titled, “Guy Carleton versus Benedict Arnold: The Campaign of 1776 in Canada 
and on Lake Champlain,” took a very different approach.  Unlike Miller and Fowler who 
were in agreement with Mahan about the role that Valcour played in the victory at 
Saratoga, Nelson refused to accept this as the main reason for the outcome.  Nelson 
instead chose to focus on both the British and American commanders who played a vital 
role in the Battle of Valcour.  He spent much of his article looking at the weaknesses of 
Carleton, stating that it was Carleton’s inaction that allowed for the delay to occur just 
prior to the battle, and that it had nothing to do with Arnold’s plans.  Nelson was very 
critical of Carleton, but Arnold and Gates did not escape his criticisms.  Instead forward 
thinking leaders, he presented them as responding to the British attempts to build a fleet.  
In addition, he criticized Arnold for not obeying Gates’s orders to return to Ticonderoga 
if the British fleet was superior, and Gates was criticized for ordering this return.  After 
Nelson took the time to examine the materials surrounding the Battle of Valcour he came 
to the conclusion that the American victory at Saratoga was not the result of the delay 
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caused by Valcour, but was rather the result of Carleton’s hesitancy to launch an attack 
against the American forces.  In this way Nelson’s arguments were in direct opposition to 
the ideas presented by both Fowler and Miller. 
 Despite Nelson’s argument that the Battle of Valcour did not aid the American 
victory at Saratoga, it was clear that it did in fact play a role.  This battle did not only 
establish a delay that allowed the Americans to better prepare for Saratoga, but it also 
demonstrated that in 1776 the actions of the navy were still far more independent and 
decentralized than those of the army.  This was seen through Arnold’s decision to ignore 
Gates’s orders and his decision to fight a naval battle on Lake Champlain (which did not 
come from the Marine committee).188  It all began in late summer and early fall of 1776 
when the Americans decided to abandon Crown Point at a war council.189  However, with 
this decision Americans feared that they would be seen as giving up their claim on the 
lake, “to quash any rumors that by giving up Crown Point they intended to give up the 
lake, they further resolved at their meeting to take ‘Effectual Measures’ for securing 
Champlain by building more “Gundolas, Row Gallies, [and] Armed Batteaus.’”190  From 
here the construction began on these ships, and was pushed along by the “motivation” 
that Arnold supplied.  Although Arnold’s sailing experience was only trading with the 
West Indies, he paid close attention to every detail of the ships that were being 
constructed.191  Once Arnold made it clear how he expected these vessels to be 
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constructed he quickly left Skenesborough where they were being built to return to 
Ticonderoga, where he attempted to find the men he needed to man his fleet.192 
 Arnold managed to get enough men to operate his fleet, but many of them had 
never sailed before, which was a detriment to his fleet.193  Despite all of his efforts, 
Arnold would not be able to compete with the British fleet that was developing at St. 
John, on the opposite end of the lake.  British commander, Guy Carleton, had long had 
his eyes trained on Lake Champlain, which he recognized as valuable to both the British 
and the Americans because it provided the Americans with access to Quebec, and the 
British with access to New York.194  In order to ensure that he kept control of Lake 
Champlain, Carleton received help from Charles Douglas, a more than competent captain 
of the Royal Navy.  Douglas and his men were responsible for creating the British fleet 
on Lake Champlain and figuring out a way to get the British war ships anchored in the St. 
Lawrence to St. Johns.195   
The problem with this was that there was a portage around the rapids in the 
Richelieu.  This portage greatly slowed the British progress in getting their fleet to St. 
John, which caused the battle with the Americans to take place at the end of the season, 
just before ice formed on the lake.  In addition, the ship the Inflexible, had to be finished 
at St. Johns, further delaying the British fleet.196  Although the decision to get large 
British warships to St. Johns instead of building their own small fleet ultimately paid off 
for the British because they had bigger and better ships than the large, but weak 
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American fleet, the delay it took to assemble this powerful British force made further 
advances after the battle improbable.197 
In October 1776, the two fleets took to the water as they vied for control of the 
lake and access to Quebec.  Before the battle began, Arnold had little knowledge of how 
powerful the British fleet that he was about to face was.198  The British fleet was actually 
smaller than the American fleet in number of ships.  Compared to the Americans, who 
had sixteen ships, the Royal fleet had only five main ships, but they also had twenty gun 
boats and twenty-eight long boats, each lightly armed. (see tables 1 and 2).199  Where the 
British outnumbered the Americans was with the strength of the guns that they had, and 
with the number of men that they had to man their ships.200  The Royal Fleet had double 
the firepower of the American fleet, whose guns were mostly two pounders.  In addition, 
the British fleet had about seven hundred seamen, each of which was experienced and a 
member of the Royal Navy.   Arnold, by contrast, had eight hundred fifty-six men, the 
majority of whom had never set foot on a ship before the battle on Lake Champlain.201  
These factors combined to give the British a decisive advantage over the Americans. 
Table 1: The British Fleet: 
Ship Armament Commanding Officer 
Inflexible, ship 18-12 pounders Lieutenant Schank 
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Maria, schooner 14-6 pounders Lieutenant Starke 
Carleton, schooner 12-6 poundrs Lieutenant Dacres 
Thunderer, radeau 6-24 pounders 
6-12 pounders 
2 Howitzers 
Lieutenant Scott 
Loyal Convert, gondola 7-9 pounders Lieutenant Longcroft 
20 gun boats Some 24 pounders, 9 
pounders and Howitzers. 
Four long boats Carriage gun 
Twenty-four long boats No armament, just 
provisions. 
202 
Table 2: The American Fleet: 
Ship Armament 
Enterprise, sloop 12 guns 
Royal Savage, schooner 12 guns 
Revenge, schooner 8 guns 
Liberty, schooner 8 guns 
Lee, row-galley 6 guns 
Trumbull, row-galley 8 guns 
Congress, row-galley 8 guns 
Washington, row-galley 8 guns 
8 gondolas 3 guns a piece 
203 
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 The battle between these two mismatched forces began on October 11, 1776 
around 11:30 am as the British ships and gondolas came within musket range of the 
American fleet.204  Within an hour the battle “became general, and very warm.  Some of 
the enemy’s ships, and all their gondolas, beat and rowed up within musket shot of us.”205  
The battle continued in this manner until five p.m., when the British fleet moved back six 
to seven hundred yards.  This moderate retreat, however, did not end the British barrage 
of the Americans.  The fighting continued until dark, when it ceased until October 13.206   
During the fighting on October 11 the gondola, the Philadelphia, and one of the 
American schooners were lost in the action. The British used their Native American allies 
to continue the attack on the Americans throughout the night. Despite these pressures, the 
Americans were able to formulate their plans for the next day in the semi-calm of the 
night.207 
 The next day the Americans headed towards Crown Point where they hoped to 
replenish their supplies, which were greatly depleted from the battle the previous day.208  
However, in order to reach their destination the American fleet would have to sneak past 
the British fleet laying in wait.  The fleet left Cumberland Bay for Crown Point at two 
p.m., but the winds did not blow in their favor, so at first they made little progress.209  By 
6pm the winds were in favor of the American fleet, and allowed them to hasten their 
progress towards Crown Point.  By six a.m. the next morning the fleet was only twenty-
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eight miles away from their final destination.210  At this point everything seemed to be in 
favor of the American fleet.  However, that morning the winds shifted again, and the 
British were able to catch up with the colonial fleet, which ushered in the second day of 
battle.211  Coming up alongside the American fleet the Royal Navy laid on heavy fire.  
The American vessel, the Washington, was so battered from the fighting on the eleventh 
that after only a few broadsides she surrendered to the British.212 
 While the Washington was the first ship to surrender to the British during the 
early part of the engagement, it was only one of the American ships that succumbed to 
Britain’s superior might.  Three British ships attacked the American row-galley, the 
Congress, at one time.  The heavy fire that the Congress was exposed to caused its sails, 
rigging, and hull to be destroyed.  When the Congress was too damaged to fight, Arnold, 
“[ran] her ashore burnt her and escaped.”213  At the same time that the Congress was 
burned, the Americans also burned four of their eight gondolas to prevent them from 
falling into British hands.214  After this engagement with the British, the American fleet 
was able to limp its way to Crown Point and then on to Ticonderoga.  The Battle of 
Valcour cost the American fleet on Lake Champlain one third of its crew.215  In addition 
to losing many of his men, Arnold, also lost more than half of his fleet, “our Strength on 
the Water now remaining is one Sloop, 12 guns, Two Schooners, 8 guns each, Two 
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Galleys & one Gondola.”216  This massive American loss hardly compared to the minute 
losses suffered by the British.  For example, the Royal Navy suffered only forty 
casualties compared to the one third of the entire force that the Americans lost.217  The 
Battle of Valcour was clearly a British victory.218   
219 
 Although this was a British victory, the amount of time that it took the British to 
prepare for this battle ultimately cost them Saratoga, the major turning point of the 
American Revolution.220  The Battle of Valcour also revealed that the independent, 
decentralized nature of the American naval forces was still a major part of the naval 
warfare even at the end of 1776.  Arnold demonstrated the independent nature of the navy 
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because he was not afraid to take on a far superior force, and even refused to 
acknowledge the possibility of an American defeat,  
This Officer, fiery, hot, and impetuous, but without discretion, never 
thought of informing himself how the enemy went on, and he had no idea 
of retiring to when he saw them coming, tho so much superior to his 
force.221 
 
This demonstrated Arnold’s independent style of leadership because he was so confident 
in his abilities that he did not feel the need to listen to his superior officers, such as Gates, 
when it was recommended that he not take on a superior force.222   
Instead, Arnold relied on his own intuition, and his confidence in his location on 
the lake, to make the decision to risk everything and take on the British.223   That Arnold 
was able to make such a decision without any consequences from his superiors speaks to 
the decentralized nature of the Continental forces in regard to naval forces.  This battle 
also demonstrated the strong connections that the navy and the army had in this early 
period, because although Arnold and Gates were in the army, they were able to carry out 
an effective naval battle.  Once again Valcour’s location in the periphery was important 
to this battle.  The location of Valcour made it difficult for the British to transport their 
warships there.  This delayed the occurrence of the battle, which in turn delayed their 
attack on Saratoga.  Without the one-year delay, the colonists may not have been 
successful at Saratoga.  Thus, the location of Valcour in the periphery allowed for a 
delay, which prepared the colonists for a major victory.  
The ramifications of the Battle of Valcour went beyond an American defeat.  Like 
at Machias, provisions had to be made for the protection of Ticonderoga, where the 
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Americans feared the British would attack next.224  One way in which these concerns 
were assuaged was by requesting that additional militia be sent to Ticonderoga.  By 
October 24, 1776 this request was met, and General Philip Schulyer had sent the militia 
to Ticonderoga.225  For additional defense, Arnold stated in his letter to Schulyer that, “A 
boom will be laid across the Lake this day, and a bridge to-morrow.”226  Arnold did not 
just want more troops and defense for Ticonderoga, but also desired that more supplies 
and ammunition be sent to the fort.227  All of this was done in preparation for the attack 
that the Americans feared was coming.228  Luckily for the Americans the British decided 
to hold off their attack until the following year because the season was getting so late that 
ice would soon be forming on the lake.229 
 The American fleet may have been defeated during the Battle of Valcour, but that 
did not mean that they fought poorly.  Praise for the American efforts on Lake Champlain 
appeared in the October 23 edition of the Pennsylvania Gazette.  In this article the British 
praised the Americans for their bravery.230  The American fleet was further praised in a 
letter from Governor Jonathan Trumbull to Governor Nicholas Cooke, “[…] General 
Arnold in the Congress Galley fought till he could stand no longer […].”231  The 
references to American bravery demonstrated that although the Americans lost, they were 
still recognized as being a worthy opponent.  In addition, the British further demonstrated 
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their respect for the Americans by quickly paroling the American prisoners, instead of 
keeping them as a bargaining chip for the release of British prisoners.  By October 23, 
1776 the Connecticut Journal reported that the prisoners were paroled and on their way 
home.232   
The Battle of Valcour demonstrated how effective an American naval force could 
be if they had the right leader, even if the fleet ended up losing.  This was demonstrated 
by the acknowledgement of American bravery during the battle, and the fact that they 
managed to sink several British gondolas during the first day of battle.233  It also laid the 
foundation for an American victory at Saratoga by taking the fight to the lake, which 
delayed the British force.  This battle captured the nature of early naval battles, and 
further revealed the effects and connections that naval battles had with land battles.   
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 Although the naval and land fronts of the war each had its own commanding 
officer, the war at sea and on land was interconnected.  A useful comparison can be made 
between the Battle at Machias and the Battle on Lexington Green.  These two battles are 
often contrasted because they started the war at sea and on land.  However, there are 
many more parallels between these two battles.  Machias and Lexington were not the 
only areas of overlap between the two fronts of the war.  Connections also existed 
between the Battle of Valcour and the Battle of Saratoga, and between the army and 
navy, more generally, as was demonstrated by the Battle of Nassau.  Considering these 
similarities yields a fuller understanding of naval warfare in 1775 and 1776 because they 
reveal that American success in the war was dependent on the actions of both the navy 
and the army. 
 The first battle of the American Revolution occurred on April 19, 1775 in 
Lexington, Massachusetts.235  The trouble in Lexington began when British forces 
encountered the town’s militia, which had been alerted of the British arrival the previous 
night.  Men such as Paul Revere, John Williams, and William Dawes spread the word 
throughout the Massachusetts countryside that the British troops were marching through 
the countryside.236  After hearing these warnings Captain John Parker mustered the 
Lexington militia on the town green, so that they could decide what to do if the British 
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marched through their town.237  At 4:30 a.m. the British regulars were fast approaching 
the town, and Parker rallied his troops, “in a few minutes Parker had two ranks of a little 
over seventy men drawn up about a hundred yards from the road to Concord.”238  The 
battle began with a famous but anonymous first shot, and in that brief instant the 
Revolutionary War commenced.  After several volleys the British troops reformed their 
columns and continued down the road to Concord.  The Lexington militia was left with 
eight dead, including John Parker, and ten wounded.239 
 The Battle of Machias did not lead to many casualties, and did not involve a 
sizeable British force, but it still shared many qualities with Lexington.  Lexington and 
Machias were compared in an article published in the Aldine, called “The Lexington of 
the Sea,” in 1876, because they each started a front of the war.  This article stated that 
James Fenimore first made this comparison.240  There were other similarities between 
these two battles.  In both instances the town Patriots were aware of the British 
presence.241  In Lexington this was demonstrated by the troops that had assembled to face 
the British, and in Machias by the threats that the schooners belonging to Ichabod Jones 
would be attacked.242  Another similarity between these two battles was that the attacks 
that occurred were made by a group of colonists dedicated to the cause, and not an 
official military force, although the militia at Lexington was more formal than the group 
of Patriots at Machias.243  Each of these battles demonstrated that a relatively small group 
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of colonists was willing to stand up to a British force in order to protect their town from a 
perceived threat.244 
 The Battle of Valcour and the Battle of Saratoga were connected in a different 
way because the Battle of Valcour directly aided the crucial American victory at Saratoga 
by delaying the British.245  When Benedict Arnold began preparing an American fleet 
that could face the British on Lake Champlain, Carleton decided that he needed a strong 
British fleet to take on the Americans.  Unfortunately for Carleton, this required taking 
the ships on a ten-mile portage to get around the rapids of the Richelieu.246  This delayed 
the battle on Champlain until October, and thus did not give the British forces enough 
time to pursue the Americans before the winter arrived.247  This delay gave the 
Americans time to prepare for the Battle of Saratoga, which ultimately resulted in a 
crucial United States victory.  The British also faced numerous delays during the Battle 
of Saratoga, which led to their defeat. As the historian Robert Middlekauff has noted, 
“Burgoyne had delayed too long, and unable to cross the river, had no choice but to ask 
for terms.”248 The Battle of Saratoga was the turning point of the war and guaranteed that 
the French would formally ally with and assist the Americans.249 
 Although the Battle of Nassau did not directly correlate to a land battle in the 
American Revolution, it still demonstrated the connections that existed between the army 
and the navy.  After Esek Hopkins successfully captured the munitions and supplies held 
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in Fort Nassau in New Providence, Bahamas, he made the voyage back to the United 
States.250  However, during this voyage many of the American soldiers became very sick 
with the smallpox.251  This decimated Hopkins’s crew.  In order to deal with this 
shortage, he turned to General Washington to request that his forces be replenished with 
men from the army.252  This request demonstrated that while the navy and army were two 
separate entities it was acceptable for one commander to request aid from the other.  With 
connections such as this it was no wonder that there were similarities between the ways 
in which the land and sea wars occurred. Each front of this war had its own unique 
features, but when looked at together it became clear that in order for the war to be 
successful, they needed to rely upon each other.  This connection was further 
demonstrated in the final battle of the war, when the Continental Army and the French 
Navy came together to corner Cornwallis on the Yorktown Peninsula and achieved 
American victory.253  Success for the Americans would have been improbable without 
army and navy cooperation. 
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The Continental Navy has long remained hidden in the history of the American 
Revolution because when compared to the army it seems relatively unsuccessful and was 
overshadowed by the mighty naval European superpowers.  However, American naval 
forces should still be remembered.  This unique force brought together leading political 
actors in Congress and local people in coastal communities who decided to take the 
conflict to the sea, whether it was officially approved by Congress or not.  From 1775-
1776, the naval force of the United Colonies was a decentralized and independent force 
despite having formal organizing structures such as the Marine Committee.  The colonists 
at Machias who engaged the British sloop Margaretta and the merchant Ichabod Jones, 
even after a majority of the colonists supported his presence, demonstrated a bold, 
independent spirit, which was similarly demonstrated by Captain Esek Hopkins who 
ignored his orders to clear the British from the American coast and instead launched an 
attack against New Providence in the Bahamas.  Finally, Benedict Arnold and his 
freshwater fleet on Lake Champlain ignored the advice of superior officers and engaged a 
far larger British force. 
 Although each of these battles highlights the decentralized and independent nature 
of the naval war in the American Revolution, they also demonstrate that Americans could 
take on the British.  Even at Valcour, where Arnold suffered defeat, the American forces 
were heralded for bravery and determination.  When put in the context of the land war, it 
 7? 
is clear that the naval Revolution was intimately connected with the land battles.  In his 
book Rebels Under Sail, Fowler best captured the role of the navy in the American 
Revolution,  
Compared to the enemy’s squadrons, the Continental navy was a puny 
force.  Nevertheless, against overwhelming odds, they ventured to sea, and 
in their own way, both by victory and defeat, they helped to achieve 
independence.  For that they deserve to be remembered.255 
 
The American naval force that existed from 1775-1776 was like no other naval force.  Its 
commanders often did as they pleased, and answered to no one but themselves, but 
despite its decentralized organization the navy managed to achieve victories against the 
Royal Navy that successfully avanced the War for Independence. 
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